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Fisheries management

2014-09-22 — 2024-10-06

quality 3.3

Wherein Fisheries Management Is Recorded as Having Been Studied and the Transferable‑quota System, in Which a Government‑set Total Allowable Catch Is Apportioned Into Tradable Individual Shares, Is Noted.

economics
faster pussycat
game theory
incentive mechanisms
institutions
Figure 1

In a former life, I studied fisheries management, and wrote an honours thesis on the Transferable quotas system. I do not have much to say on it these days, except that I wish to keep this fact memorialized, and also I think that Transferable quotas are an elegant case of mechanism design.

1 Transferable quotas

Transferable quotas: This is a system where the government sets a total allowable catch for a fishery, and then divides this up into individual quotas that can be traded. It is an elegant system; it looks like it makes fishers internalize the externalities of overfishing, and it can be shown to be efficient in a competitive equilibrium (Aslin, Connor, and Fisher 2001; Connor and Alden 2001; Connor 2004; Grafton et al. 2006).

2 References

Aslin, Connor, and Fisher. 2001. “Sharing in the Catch or Cashing in the Share? Social Impacts of Individual Transferable Quotas and the South East Fishery.”
Christy. 1973. “Fisherman Quotas : A Tentative Suggestion for Domestic Management.”
Connor. 2004. “Individual Transferable Quota in Fisheries Management.”
Connor, and Alden. 2001. “Indicators of the Effectiveness of Quota Markets: The South East Trawl Fishery of Australia.” Marine and Freshwater Research.
Gordon. 1954. “The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery.” The Journal of Political Economy.
Grafton, Arnason, Bjørndal, et al. 2006. “Incentive-Based Approaches to Sustainable Fisheries.” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences.