Player vs game
December 18, 2018 — July 26, 2022
adaptive
collective knowledge
economics
evolution
faster pussycat
game theory
incentive mechanisms
institutions
networks
social graph
sociology
The most primitive exemplar of why we care about mechanism design: Blaming the player versus changing the game.
1 Bad games
2 Incoming
3 References
Easley, and Kleinberg. 2010. Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World.
Helbing, Johansson, and Al-Abideen. 2007. “The Dynamics of Crowd Disasters: An Empirical Study.” Physical Review E.
Helbing, and Mukerji. 2012. “Crowd Disasters as Systemic Failures: Analysis of the Love Parade Disaster.” EPJ Data Science.
Johansson, Helbing, Al-Abideen, et al. 2008. “From Crowd Dynamics to Crowd Safety: A Video-Based Analysis.” Advances in Complex Systems.
Moussaïd, Helbing, and Theraulaz. 2011. “How Simple Rules Determine Pedestrian Behavior and Crowd Disasters.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.