Public goods

Rival and excludable goods, you need to know what these are

September 22, 2010 — October 4, 2024

economics
faster pussycat
game theory
incentive mechanisms
institutions
networks
Figure 1

Economists often classify goods based on two key dimensions: rivalry and excludability. These characteristics determine how goods are consumed and whether they can be efficiently allocated.

Depending on which combination of these qualities we have, we face different mechanism design problems.

Excludable Non-Excludable
Rival Private Goods
e.g., food, clothing
Common Pool Resources
e.g., fisheries, forests
Non-Rival Club Goods
e.g., subscription services, private parks
Public Goods
e.g., national defence, clean air

Without these concepts in our vocabulary, the world is more confusing. Understanding these classifications helps us think about issues like overuse, under-provision, and free-riding. For instance:

1 Incoming

Public Goods and Common Pools: Introduction to Energy and Earth Sciences Economics * Buterin, Hitzig, and Weyl (2019) considers an interesting mechanism for funding public goods via voting systems.

2 References

Afonso. 2014. How Academia Resembles a Drug Gang.” SSRN Scholarly Paper.
Buterin, Hitzig, and Weyl. 2019. A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods.” Management Science.
Hanna. 1997. The New Frontier of American Fisheries Governance.” Ecological Economics.
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science.
Hardin, Russell. 1971. Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners’ Dilemma.” Behavioral Science.
Krikorian, and Kapczynski. 2010. Access to knowledge in the age of intellectual property.
Ostrom. 1992. “The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common Property Institutions.” Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy.
Ostrom, Burger, Field, et al. 1999. Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science.
Potts, Hartley, Montgomery, et al. 2016. A Journal Is a Club: A New Economic Model for Scholarly Publishing.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2763975.
Sekeris. 2012. The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World.” Working Paper 1213.