I have nothing to say about foundational game theory itself, except to note that JD Williams’ book, The Compleat Strategyst (Williams 1966) is online for free, so you should get it.

How long until we approach Nash equilibiruim,
also includes a note on Aumann’s *correlated equilibrium* which i would like to
know about.

## Shapley value

The Shapley value is a model of fair distribition of the proceeds of a coalition game. Ends up being interesting for feature selection and collective action problems and model explanation. TBC

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