Complexity of markets

Computation in economic mechanisms

February 20, 2021 — May 13, 2021

economics
incentive mechanisms
institutions
markets
money
Figure 1

What is the computational power of a market? What is the computational complexity of the work that markets do? Socialist calculation debate. Computational complexity and command-and-control-economics.

Classic: Cosma Shalizi: In Soviet Union, Optimization Problem Solves You. See also his notebook on Planned Economies.

1 References

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