Spontaneous order, local knowledge, strategic belief, and other castings of the relationship of beliefs and habits as in the social order. I have no original thoughts on this, but I like to keep links on this theme where I can see them so that they don’t bite me.
The function of belief
David Banks’s [diatribe](David Banks, Podcast Out perhaps illustrates a particular kind of strategic belief: “[Radiolab recasts] the political as endlessly unresolved scientific controversies, and act as science concern trolls,” he claims. These “explainerist” nuggets of satisfying factiness - why are they popular? One answer might be that they are a good marker of membership in a tribe that likes a certain kind of cocktail conversation.
More generally, what kind of beliefs prosper in society? What is the function of our truth claims? When should you believe “true” things, and what are true things anyway?
Goal: find a way of navigating the pragmatic functions of belief that sidestep the divisions in this anecdote:
I know this sounds like a story from some bad conservative novel, but it is not unheard of for rooms full of PhDs to applaud when someone says that, for example, witchcraft is just another way of knowledge and that disputing factual claims to its power is cultural hegemony.
To my ear’s it’s the emphases that make this sound uncomfortable rather than the broad-stroke outline. On one hand I think that empirical fact is special in having a reality independent of human existence. On the other hand, I don’t suppose any of our epistemological methods give us perfect access to the reality I posit. Having claimed my beliefs are not, with 100% certainty, raw and unmediated rays of truth, I have opened the door to negotiating how certain my beliefs are, and admitting that other ways perspectives might have a point that I cannot dismiss a priori.
Also, how about beliefs that are not about facts as such? Does human knowledge transmission at large deal mostly in transmission of precise factual claims about reproducible experiments, or is there a whole bunch of other stuff going on with an indirect relationship to facts about gross physical reality, and some kind of active role in creating whatever passes for facts in the negotiated social reality?
Option B. We need the tools unpack the other propensities in the uses of the language around belief, and disentangle what is going with cheap talk and signalling. We do deploy belief in a variety of ways, often emotional, often figurative. And in any case, scientist at their most precise and factual still uses emotion and metaphor to do communicative work. That is, I suspect, practically unavoidable, or worse, inefficient.
The rationality of the Great Society
🏗, quote Lou Keep, The Use and Abuse of Witchdoctors for Life and Constantin, In defense of individualist culture, and Hayek’s “constructivist fallacy”, Timothy Morton’s Hyperobjects, and Berkes and Folke’s “local knowledge”, pragmatist notions of a belief’s “cash value”, local versus global truth, and all the other dissections of these problems, and wonder about idiosyncratic spontaneous group order etc. Discuss Social Capital and other economic framings as a method for making metis “legible”. The Master Currency displacing other possible currencies. Or, to have this phrased in a manner intelligible to management, Florent Crivello, The Efficiency-Destroying magic of tidying up.
Policy and Statistical learning
TODO. Brief digression on how legibility and management looks as a statistical learning problem. We know that constructing policies is costly in data, and we know that administrative procedures frequently do not have much data from repeated trials of what works. We also know that coming up with policies (in a machine learning or in a political definition) is computationally challenging and data hungry. How does the need to bow to the ill-fitting bureaucracy of the Great Society resemble having to work with an underfit estimator of the optimal policy? What does that tell us about, e.g. optimal jurispudence? Possibly something. Or possibly the metaphor doesn’t work; after all, what is the optimisation problem one solves?
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