Governance of the commons
On the mysterious fact that most people get on with most of their neighbours most of the time
October 29, 2014 — September 2, 2021
cooperation
culture
distributed
economics
hand wringing
incentive mechanisms
mind
networks
policy
sociology
wonk
Suspiciously similar content
A particular sub-class of social institutions. Back in my undergraduate days, this was massive for me, but I’ve been thinking of other things since then. I could do with a refresher. For now, google Elinor Ostrom and David Putnam and the critiques of those authors for a flavour of this. Especially Ostrom.
1 Taxonomy of public goods
See public goods.
2 Institutions that manage these
Nadia Eghbal, An alternate ending to the tragedy of the commons, points to the failure of online discourse as an issue of managing the commons.
4 References
Buterin, Hitzig, and Weyl. 2019. “A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods.” Management Science.
Hanna. 1997. “The New Frontier of American Fisheries Governance.” Ecological Economics.
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science.
Hardin, Russell. 1971. “Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners’ Dilemma.” Behavioral Science.
Levin. 2000. Fragile Dominion: Complexity and the Commons.
Ostrom. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions).
———. 1992. “The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common Property Institutions.” Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy.
Ostrom, Burger, Field, et al. 1999. “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science.
Putnam. 1993. “The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life.” The American Prospect.
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti. 1993. “Social Capital and Institutional Success.” In Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Sekeris. 2012. “The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World.” Working Paper 1213.