Financing utopia

Hedonistic mechanism design


Hush, I cited Randall Munroe and that is OK.

On better ways to get capital-intensive risky things done. Weird stakeholder models. Worker owned firms. Der Mittelstand. Capitalism’s end game. Mechanism design, Should probably include Prediction market and/or mechanism design angles.

For descriptive stuff, see Finance, descriptives. For actual strategies in already-existing markets, portfolio theory.

Cat and Girl

Worker-owned institutions

Other financey things

Indie VC:

We’ve worked with the team at Cooley to create an investment instrument that has elements of both debt and equity. Debt in that we will not be purchasing equity initially, but, unlike debt, there is no maturity date, no collateralization of assets and no recourse if it’s never paid back. The equity element will only become a factor if the participating company chooses to raise a round of financing or sell out to an acquiring company. We don’t have a clever acronym or name for this instrument yet, but I’m sure we’ll come up with something great.

This instrument gives us a lot more flexibility to work with different types of companies than the Delaware C-Corps most commonly funded by VCs. It also facilitates the two elements of the indie.vc terms that were most important to us and to founders: cash distributions and contingent equity conversion.

equitise: Equity crowdfunding for private companies in Australia/NZ. I kind of like that this exists but also… why would you rationally take on the higher risk of non-listed firms? There are other operators locally in IPOs at least.

Lend for Good:

A platform through which the crowd can lend money to growing businesses that are delivering impact. […]

  • Impact SMEs post deals for the capital they need to the crowd.

  • Lenders in the crowd choose the deals they support because of the business, the terms and the impact.

  • Borrowers chase their business and impact goals, and repay their lenders an agreed interest rate after an agreed time frame.

  • Taylor Pearson, Blockchain man mashes up utopian freelance precarious market-ism with tech trends, but shies short of calling it a manifesto because it is notionally about how people will talk about our micropayment future, not what will actually happen.

    The Balkanization that began in the late 20th century with the fracturing of post-colonial Africa and post-USSR Eastern Europe will continue through the 21st century. The city-state will become the organizing unit of global society.

    Much like the Catholic Church today, Nation-States will continue to play a meaningful, but secondary role. […]

    Instead of a paycheck, The Blockchain Man’s income will be a large number of micropayments from past projects. The tokens from different projects will appreciate or depreciate based on the success of the project (and perhaps pay dividends). […]

    Where the Organization Man’s world was defined by The Organization, The Blockchain Man’s world will be defined by markets.

    Even something as simple as commuting will be market driven.

    What happens when you mash blockchains, Uber and Self-driving cars together? The self-owning car.

    A car that pays for its lease, its insurance, and its gas, by giving people rides. A car that is not owned by a corporation. It is a corporation. The car exists as an autonomous financial entity, potentially with no human ownership.

Superannuation and pension funds

Pro-social superannuation/retirement funds in australia include Australian Ethical and Future Super.

Abramitzky, Ran. 2018. The Mystery of the Kibbutz: Egalitarian Principles in a Capitalist World. The Princeton Economic History of the Western World. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Coad, Alex, and Martin Binder. 2014. “Causal Linkages Between Work and Life Satisfaction and Their Determinants in a Structural VAR Approach.” Economics Working Paper Archive wp_809. Levy Economics Institute. https://ideas.repec.org/p/lev/wrkpap/wp_809.html.

Dyck, Alexander, and Luigi Zingales. 2002. “Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison.” Working Paper 8711. National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w8711.

Freeman, Richard B., Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse. 2010. “Introduction to "Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-Based Stock Options".” NBER, April, 1–37. http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8085.

Gilman, Nils, and Yakov Feygin. 2020. “The Mutualist Economy: A New Deal for Ownership.” Berggruen institute.

Gonza, Tej, and David Ellerman. 2019. “Worker Ownership and the Current Crisis.” In Sukobi.Stabilnost.Demokratija? http://www.ellerman.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/WorkerOwnershipAndCurrentCrisis.pdf.

Jeners, Nils, and Wolfgang Prinz. 2014. “Metrics for Cooperative Systems.” In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Supporting Group Work, 91–99. ACM. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2660407.

Kruse, Douglas. 2002. “Research Evidence on Prevalence and Effects of Employee Ownership.” Journal of Employee Ownership Law and Finance 14 (4): 65–90. http://esop.com/pdf/esopHistoryAndResearch/researchEvidence.pdf.

Kruse, Douglas L., Richard B. Freeman, and Joseph R. Blasi. 2010. Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-Based Stock Options. University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226056968.001.0001.

Logue, John, and Jacqueline Yates. 2005. “Productivity in Cooperatives and Work-Owned Enterprises: Ownership and Participation Make a Difference.” Geneva: International Labor Office. http://community-wealth.org/content/productivity-cooperatives-and-work-owned-enterprises-ownership-and-participation-make.

Morck, Randall, and Bernard Yeung. 2010. “Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism.” Working Paper 16490. National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w16490.

Oakes, Jason. n.d. “Getting Ahead Collectively in a Post-Industrial Economy.” Berggruen institute.

Palladino, Lenore. 2019. “RIP Shareholder Primacy.” Text. Boston Review. August 21, 2019. http://bostonreview.net/class-inequality/lenore-palladino-rip-shareholder-primacy.

Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales. 2000. “The Governance of the New Enterprise.” Working Paper 7958. National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w7958.

———. 1998. “Power in a Theory of the Firm.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (2): 387–432. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555630.

Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1997. “A Survey of Corporate Governance.” The Journal of Finance 52 (2): 737–83. https://doi.org/10.2307/2329497.

Tortorice, Daniel L., David E. Bloom, Paige Kirby, and John Regan. 2020. “A Theory of Social Impact Bonds.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3643195. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3643195.

Vojtko, Radovan, and Dominik Cisár. 2020. “Bitcoin in a Time of Financial Crisis.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3557575. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3557575.

Zingales, Luigi. 2000. “In Search of New Foundations.” The Journal of Finance 55 (4): 1623–53. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00262.